The aim of this paper is to investigate the expressibility of classical propositional monomodal logics. To this end, a notion of embedding of one logic into another is introduced, which is, roughly, a translation preserving theoremhood. This enables to measure the expressibility of a logic by a (finite or infinite) number of logics embeddable into it. This measure is calculated here for a large family of modal logics including K, K4, KB, K5, GL, T, S4, B, S5, Grz, and provability logics. It is also shown that some of these logics (e.g., all normal logics containing the symmetry axiom except for the logics Triv, Ver, and the intersection of these two) are not embeddable into some others (e.g., K, K4, K5, GL, T, S4, Grz).
Introduction
In this paper we consider logics in the propositional language augmented by a unary modal operator . Let Fm denote the set of formulas of this language. Each formula ϕ(p) ∈ Fm of at most one variable p induces a modality, i.e., an operator ∇ ϕ : Fm → Fm defined by ∇ ϕ (A) := ϕ(A), for all A ∈ Fm. The familiar examples of modalities are the operators of necessity , possibility ♦ (i.e., ¬ ¬), and non-contingency ∆ (induced by the formula p ∨ ¬p).
Given a modal logic L, it is natural to measure its expressive power by a number of "distinct" modalities in L. However, there are (at least) two different approaches to formalise the quoted word.
According to the first, or internal, approach, modalities are identified if they are equivalent in L, i.e., if the equivalence of formulas they are induced by is a theorem of L. Typical results in the scope of this approach can be found in [3, p. 10] , [5, 11, 15, 17] , though in these papers only linear modalities, i.e. sequences of s and ¬s, are mainly under consideration.
The second, or external, approach prescribes not to distinguish between modalities having an identical "behaviour" over L. Before giving a more precise description of this approach, let us consider an illustration.
For n > 0, denote by n a sequence of n s. Modalities n are known to be pairwise non-equivalent in the logic B (see Subsection 3.2 for the definition of B) and hence they are distinct from the viewpoint of the internal approach. However, no formula distinguishes them. That is, if we denote by A n the result of replacing of all s in a formula A by n then A is a theorem of B iff A n is, as will be proved in Theorem 3.22. In this situation we can say that modalities n have the same behaviour over B.
In general, to each modality ∇ we assign a ∇-translation tr ∇ of formulas by putting tr ∇ (A) to be the result of replacing of all occurrences of the symbol in a formula A by the operator ∇. Further, we define a logic L(∇) of a modality ∇ over a logic L as the set of all formulas whose ∇-translations are theorems of L. Finally, a logic M is called embeddable into L if M = L(∇) for some modality ∇; here tr ∇ serves as an embedding of M into L in the sense that, for all A ∈ Fm, A is a theorem of M iff tr ∇ (A) is a theorem of L. Thus, the external approach prescribes, given a logic L, to identify modalities having equal logics over L; we call these modalities analogous over L.
A rather close but different is the notion of simulation of modal logics explored in [8] ; therein, a simulation is a translation of a more general kind and it is to preserve not only theoremhood but also a consequence relation.
Let us mention some well-known results and concepts related to the external approach. In [3, Chapter 12 ] the logic of a modality (induced by p ∧ p) over the Gödel-Löb logic GL is proved to coincide with the Grzegorczyk logic Grz, i.e., GL( ) = Grz. It is also shown there that GL is not embeddable into Grz. In the same way, one can easily see that K( ) = T and K4( ) = S4, whereas K is not embeddable into T, as well as K4 into S4. A logic L is called iterative if L( n ) = L, for all n > 0. In [1] this property was considered for the well-known family of provability logics (cf. [2, 7] ). In [6, 9] the logics of non-contingency modality ∆ over K and K4 are axiomatised, whereas in [12, 13, 14] the same is done for T, S4, S5, and some other logics.
In this paper we address some issues within the framework of the external approach. The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 introduces basic notions and notation. In Section 2 a family of 15 logics of so called prime modalities is found and is proved to be exhaustive in the sense that a logic of any prime modality over any (consistent) logic belongs to the family. In Section 3 we measure the expressibility of the logics of prime modalities, some normal logics, and the provability logics. The iterativity of the logic B is also established in Subsection 3.3. The final Section 4 presents new positive and negative results concerning a possibility of embedding of some particular logics into some others. In particular, we show that any normal extension of the logic KB except for Triv, Ver, and Triv ∩ Ver is not embeddable into K, K4, K5, GL, T, S4, Grz, and some provability logics.
Definitions and notation
The propositional monomodal language consists of a denumerable set of variables Var = {p 0 , p 1 , . . .}, symbols for falsehood ⊥, implication →, and a unary modal operator . Other connectives ( , ¬, ∧, ∨, ↔, ♦) are taken as standard abbreviations. The set of formulas Fm is defined as usual. Definition 1.1 A modality induced by a formula ϕ(p) of at most one variable p is an operator ∇: Fm → Fm defined by ∇(A) := ϕ(A), for all A ∈ Fm.
Modalities induced by formulas ⊥, , p, ¬p, p ∧ p, and n p, where n > 0, will be denoted by ⊥, , , ¬, , and n , respectively. Clearly, all modalities are built up from ⊥ and using → and . Definition 1.2 Given a modality ∇, a ∇-translation is a map tr ∇ : Fm → Fm defined as follows:
. That is, tr ∇ replaces all s by ∇s. Definition 1.3 A (classical propositional monomodal ) logic is a set L ⊆ Fm containing all classical tautologies in the modal language and closed under the rules of modus ponens and substitution:
Here A[B/p] denotes the result of simultaneous substituting a formula B for all occurrences of a variable p in A. In the sequel, we consider only consistent logics, i.e., proper subsets of Fm. We often use a notation
E denotes the smallest logic closed under the rule of equivalent replacement:
If L is a calculus given by a set of axioms and rules and X ⊆ Fm then denote by L + X the calculus obtained from L by adding formulas of X as axiom schemata and by LX the calculus whose axioms are theorems of L and formulas of X taken as axiom schemata and whose only rule is (MP). Definition 1.4 A logic of a modality ∇ over a logic L is the set of all formulas whose ∇-translations are theorems of L:
, for all A ∈ Fm. The converse does not hold in general, as was already noted in Introduction: modalities n are non-equivalent but analogous over the logic B. Definition 1.6 A constant is a formula containing no variables; a modality induces by it will also be called a constant.
A modality induced by a formula ϕ(p) having no occurrences of p in the scope of is called prime. A prime logic is a logic of any prime modality over any (consistent) logic. Any prime logic is closed under (RE) even if L is not.
Prime logics
In this section we show that there are exactly 15 prime logics and present natural axiomatisations thereof. We also show that, given a logic L and a prime modality ∇, to determine which of these 15 logics equals L(∇) it suffices to find the characteristic function (c.f.) of ∇ over L. We shall see that the latter problem is decidable whenever the variable-free fragment of L is decidable. Therefore, a c.f. contains the full information about the behaviour of ∇ over L.
Throughout, we identify a boolean function f : 2 n → 2, where 2 = {⊥, }, with any (fixed) boolean formula (i.e., formula containing no s) representing f , e.g., with its full disjunctive normal form (FDNF):
Definition 2.1 A characteristic function (c.f.) of a modality ∇ over a logic L is the least element of a set
w.r.t. the following partial order:
Each ∇ has a unique c.f. since F L ∇ is non-empty, finite, and closed under the pointwise conjunction of functions, hence its least element is merely the conjunction of all its elements.
Let ∇ be a prime modality, then a formula ∇p is truth-functionally equivalent to (p ∧ ∇ ) ∨ (¬p ∧ ∇⊥). Hence any prime logic contains a formula 
Consequently, there are no more than 15 prime logics since each of them is determined by a binary boolean function χ ≡ ⊥. On the one hand, given a logic L, there exist at least 4 prime modalities having distinct logics over L, namely, ⊥, , ¬, and . Moreover, the c.f. of each of them is independent of L:
and so are logics of these modalities. We denote these logics by Λ ⊥ , Λ , Λ ¬ , and Λ (the traditional names of Λ and Λ are Triv and Ver, respectively). However, on the other hand, nothing guarantees the existence of modalities with other c.f.'s over a given L; for instance, in the above four logics any modality is equivalent to either ⊥, , ¬, or . Nevertheless, Lemma 2.4 below argues that each χ ≡ ⊥ is "realisable" .
Let ∅ = Υ ⊆ {⊥, , ¬, } and put
Obviously, any binary boolean function χ ≡ ⊥ is representable as χ Υ for appropriate Υ. For the following, observe that if we denote by χ the cardinality of { σ | χ ( σ) = } then χ Υ = |Υ|. Lemma 2.4 shows that prime logics are exhausted by Λ Υ . In the sequel, we write Λ ⊥ instead of Λ {⊥, } and similarly for other Λ Υ and χ Υ .
Lemma 2.4
For any binary boolean function χ ≡ ⊥, there exists a logic L such that the c.f. of over L equals χ . In fact, the c.f. of over Λ Υ is χ Υ .
) does not belong to Λ ∇ and so to Λ Υ . Proof. The inclusions (⊇) are easily verified by the definition of
hence it is a tautology and thus belongs to E ∇ , whence A ∈ E ∇ .
|Υ| > 1. We use the following: if formulas A and B have no variables in common then E{A} ∩ E{B} = E{A ∨ B}. Now to prove the needed inclusion for, say
note that replacing all subformulas of the form A in ( p ↔ ⊥)∨( q ↔ q) by A ∧ (i.e., the r.h.s. of the presumed axiom of Λ ⊥ ) yields a tautology.
Measuring expressibility of logics
By ε(L) (resp., α(L)) we denote the number of modalities which are pairwise nonequivalent in (resp., non-analogous over) a logic L (in the sequel, we usually omit the word 'pairwise' in these contexts). These are either natural numbers or the symbol ∞ and may be regarded as measures of expressiveness for L.
In this section we calculate ε(L) and α(L) for the prime logics, some normal logics, and the provability logics. We also establish the iterativity of the logic B.
We begin with some general observations. For any logic L, we have ε(L) 4 and α(L) 4, since the logics of ⊥, , ¬, and are distinct over
. So far we do not know whether the same holds for α(·), even on the class of logics that are closed under (RE). The following lemma is a step towards the answer to this question.
Proof. It suffices to prove that if two modalities are equivalent in M then they are analogous over L. Assume that M ∇p ↔ ∆p. Then by induction on a formula A,
Furthermore, ε(L) is the cardinality of a boolean algebra, so by Stone's theorem, it is either ∞ or 2 n for some n > 0. On the contrary, we shall see that α(L) may be an odd number. An example is α(Λ ⊥ ¬ ) = 15.
Expressibility of prime logics
Lemma 3.2 Suppose ∇ is a proper constant in a logic L and ∆ is a boolean combination of and ∇. Then: (1) L(∆) = Λ Υ for some Υ with |Υ| 2; (2) moreover, if ∆ is "read off " from the r.h.s. of the axiom of Λ Υ for some Υ with |Υ| = 2 (e.g., for
the logic of a proper constant is the intersection of the logics of two trivial constants ⊥ and ).
Proof. (1) Any such ∆ is equivalent (and hence analogous, since ∆ is prime) to a modality mentioned in item (2) . (2) To prove that the logic of a modality, say, 
Proof. Put L := Λ Υ and L := Λ Υ . By transitivity of ' →', it suffices to prove the following claims:
A logic L has a proper constant ∇ (namely, the one occurring in the r.h.s. of the axiom of L ). Hence the claim follows from Lemma 3.2 (2) .
(c) |Υ| = 3. By Theorem 2.5, any modality ∇ is equivalent in L := Λ ⊥ to a boolean combination of and the proper constant ⊥, hence by Lemma 3.2(1), L (∇) = Λ Υ for some Υ with |Υ| 2. |Υ| = 4. It is easily seen that L := Λ ⊥ has no independent constants, hence no modalities with a c.f. . Therefore, Λ ⊥ ¬ → L . Proof. The claim for α follows from Lemma 3.4 and the fact that every modality is equivalent in (and hence analogous over) Λ Υ to a prime modality.
Any modality is equivalent in L := Λ Υ to a boolean combination of , ⊥, and ; there are exactly 256 such combinations. Take any two of them, b 1 and b 2 , and put
Expressibility of normal logics
Definition 3.6 A normal logic (cf. [3, 4] ) is a set of formulas containing the axioms (A ) and (AK) shown in Figure 2 and closed under (MP), (Sub), and the rule of necessitation: (Nec) A A Clearly, every normal logic is closed under the rule (RE). Moreover, a logic containing (AK) and is normal iff it is closed under (RE).
(A ) Tautologies in the modal language We shall mainly concerned with the well-known normal logics which are axiomatised as follows (extra axioms are shown in Figure 2 ).
We shall consider also the so called Diodorean logic D * (cf. [11] ), which is the set of all formulas that are valid on the frame (ω, ), or equivalently, the logic of the class of finite reflexive transitive linear orders.
The following strict inclusions hold between these logics:
In what follows, we use Kripke semantics of normal logics. All necessary definitions and facts can be found in [3, 4] , and we use them without explicit references. Usually we denote a frame by (W, ↑), where ↑ stands for an accessibility relation on a set of worlds W . A set of worlds accessible from w ∈ W is denoted by w↑ := {x ∈ W | w↑x}; the symbol ↓ stands for the inverse relation of
and denote by X↓ := {n − 1 | 1 < n ∈ X} the left shift of X (with X 1 lost). Recall that p ⊥ = ¬p and p = p. We define sequences of modalities ∇ X n simultaneously for all X ⊆ [1, ∞) by induction on n: Proof. Suppose ∇ n are non-equivalent in a complete logic L.
Recall that K is complete w.r.t. the class of all frames. Take any model (W, ↑, |=) and x 1 ∈ W . To prove that x 1 |= tr ∇n (A m N ), assume that x 1 |= ∇ n j∈N p j . Then there is a chain x 1 ↑x 2 ↑. . .↑x n such that ∀i, 1 i n, ∃j = j(i) ∈ N x i |= p j . Taking any J ⊆ N such that J ⊇ {j(1), . . . , j(n)} and |J | = m, we obtain x 1 |= ∇ n j∈J p j . i) . By definition of |= , this implies {x 1 , . . . , x n } ⊆ {x 1 , . . . , x n }. As x 1 |= ∇ n+1 p, there is no chain beginning at x 1 and consisting of n + 1 worlds satisfying p. In particular, for any 1 i j n, we have ¬(x j ↑x i ). Hence, there exists a unique chain consisting of n worlds belonging to the set {x 1 , . . . , x n }, namely, x 1 ↑. . .↑x n . Thus x i = x i and j(i) = i, for all i, 1 i n, so {j (1), . . . , j(n)} = {1, . . . , n} ⊆ J , which contradicts to |J | = m < n.
The lemmas imply, for any logic
Proof. GL is complete w.r.t. finite irreflexive transitive trees. So, to see that modalities ∇ n from Theorem 3.9 are non-equivalent in GL, take a frame F = ({1, . . . , n}, <) and put i |= p, for all i, 1 i n. Then F |= GL but 1 |= ∇ n p → ∇ n+1 p. Thus, firstly, ε(GL) = ∞ and hence ε(L) = ∞; secondly, by Theorem 3.9,
In comparison with this result, consider linear modalities, i.e., sequences of s and ¬s (not containing the subsequence ¬¬, without loss of generality).
Theorem 3.13 There are exactly 7 linear modalities which are non-analogous over GL, namely, , ¬, , ¬, ¬ , ♦, and ¬ .
Proof. First observe that, for any linear modality ∇ containing a subsequence ¬ , GL(∇) = Λ ⊥ . Indeed, ∇ has a form m ♦∆ or ¬ m ♦∆ for some ∆ and m 1. But
Next recall that GL is iterative (cf. [1] ), i.e., GL( n ) = GL, for all n > 0. Finally, it is easily seen that if modalities ∇ and ∆ are analogous over any logic L then so are ¬∇ and ¬∆, as well as ∇¬ and ∆¬, as well as ¬∇¬ and ¬∆¬.
From these facts the theorem follows immediately. If a logic L contains the reflexivity axiom (AT ) then the modalities from Theorem 3.9 are equivalent in L to each other, so the theorem cannot be applied to establish α(L) = ∞. The remedy is to generalise the theorem.
First, we generalise Lemma 3.10. Suppose |X| = ∞ and choose numbers 0 = n 0 < n 1 < n 2 < . . . so that X ∩ (n k , n k+1 ] = ∅, for all k 0, where we use a notation (r, t] := {s ∈ ω | r < s t}. Consider the sequence ∇ k := ∇ X n k , k 1. Observe that |X ∩ (n k , n k+1 ]| is the number of positive occurrences of p in ∇ k p, thus the condition X ∩ (n k , n k+1 ] = ∅ merely means that the number of positive occurrences of p in ∇ k p increases as k increases.
Proof. Take any model (W, ↑, |=) and x 1 ∈ W . To prove that x 1 |= tr ∇ k (A m N ), assume that x 1 |= ∇ k j∈N p j . Then there is a chain x 1 ↑x 2 ↑. . .↑x n k such that ∀i, 1 i n k , we have: if i ∈ X then x i |= p j for some ∃j = j(i) ∈ N , else x i |= p j , for any j ∈ N . Now take any J ⊆ N with |J | = m (it is possible, since N m) such that J ⊇ {j(i) | i ∈ X ∩ (0, n k ]} and obtain x 1 |= ∇ n j∈J p j .
We have succeeded in generalising Lemma 3.11 only to the case when X is an infinite arithmetical progression
Suppose ∇ k are non-equivalent in a complete logic L.
Proof. As above, for some L-frame F = (W, ↑), a valuation |= of p, and x 1 ∈ W , we have x 1 |= ∇ k p → ∇ k+1 p. Again, it suffices to find a valuation |= of p 1 , . . . , p N such that
there is a chain x 1 ↑. . .↑x n k such that x i |= p iff i ∈ X, for all i, 1 i n k , i.e., among x i there are exactly n worlds validating p; denote them by y := x i , 1 n, where i 1 < . . . < i n , {i 1 , . . . , i n } = X ∩ [1, n k ], and y |= p. Now define |= by putting y |= p , for every , 1 n. Clearly, x 1 |= ∇ k j∈N p j , since each y validates at least one of p j . But, for any J ⊆ N with |J | = m, we claim that x 1 |= ∇ n j∈J p j . Otherwise, there is a chain
Arguing as in Lemma 3.11,
we have ¬(y j ↑ d y i ), for all 1 i j n. Hence x i = y and j( ) = , for all , 1 n, thus {j(1), . . . , j(n)} = {1, . . . , n} ⊆ J in contradiction with |J | = m < n. Theorem 3.16 Suppose X ⊆ [1, ∞) is an infinite arithmetical progression and numbers 0 = n 0 < n 1 < n 2 < . . . satisfy X ∩(n k , n k+1 ] = ∅, for all k 0. Then a sequence
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.9, using Lemmas 3.14 and 3.15.
Proof. Let X be the set of odd natural numbers and n k := 2k. Then |X ∩ (n k , n k+1 ]| = 1 and modalities
. To see the latter, put F = ({1, . . . , 2k}, ) and i |= p iff i is odd, for all i, 1 i 2k. Then F |= D * but 1 |= ∇ k p → ∇ k+1 p. Now we pass to the logic KB, which it complete w.r.t. symmetric frames. For each infinite arithmetical progression X ⊆ [1, ∞), a sequence ∇ X n collapses in KB into a finite number of cosets modulo equivalence in KB.
Now put X = {1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, . . .} = {4i + 1, 4i + 2 | i 0}, n k := 4k, and consider a sequence ∇ k := ∇ X n k , k 1. To see that ∇ k are non-equivalent in KB, put F = ({1, . . . , 4k}, ↑), where i↑j iff |i − j| = 1, and i |= p iff i ∈ X. Then F |= KB but 1 |= ∇ n p → ∇ n+1 p.
We do not know whether the sequence ∇ k is (hereditary) strong. Moreover, all examples of (hereditary) strong sequences we know are covered by the ones mentioned in Theorem 3.16. But situation is not hopeless, for instead of quantifying over all complete logics as is done in the definition of a (hereditary) strong sequence, we can confine to a particular complete logic, say KB, and prove the hereditary strength of ∇ k "relative" to this logic. This way leads to success, as the following theorem demonstrates.
Proof. We only need to prove Lemma 3.15 with KB in place of L.
Unlike the proof of Lemma 3.15, now it suffices to find any symmetric frame falsifying tr ∇ k (A m N ). For this the above-mentioned KB-frame F suits, if we put variables p 1 , . . . , p n to be true at successive worlds of a set X ∩ (0, n k ]. To be more exact, if i 1 < . . . < i n and {i 1 , . . . , i n } = X ∩ (0, n k ] then we put i |= p , for all , 1 n. It is easily seen that 1 |= tr ∇ k (A m N ). The theorem follows immediately from Lemma 3.14 and 3.19. We postpone the consideration of the logic B till the next subsection. Now we come to logics of "finite expressibility" . Proof. Any modality is equivalent in S5 to one of the following 16:
(1) ∇, ¬∇, ∇¬, ¬∇¬, where ∇ is either or := → ; (2) ∇, ¬∇, where ∇ is either or := ∧ ♦; (3) ∇, ¬∇, where ∇ is either ⊥ or ∆ := ∨ ¬. Now we show that the logics of these modalities (over S5) are distinct. The logics of ⊥, , ¬, and are distinct and they differ from logics of other modalities. The logics of modalities in item (2) and of no others contain the formula ¬p ↔ ¬ p. The same holds for item (3) and the formula ¬p ↔ p. Furthermore, ( p ↔ p) ∈ S5(¬ ) \ S5( ) and p ∈ S5(∆) \ S5(¬∆), thus all modalities in items (2) and (3) are non-analogous over S5. It is even easier to verify the same for item (1) . 
First we claim that if S5 A → B then K5
A → B. Recall that K5 is complete w.r.t. Euclidean frames. For any Euclidean frame (W, ↑) and w ∈ W , the restriction of ↑ to w↑ is total, so the frame (w↑, ↑) validates S5 and hence the formula A → B, whence w |= (A → B) and finally w |= A → B, by the distributivity axiom (AK). Now, since in S5 every modality is equivalent to one of ∇ 1 , . . . , ∇ 16 mentioned in the proof of Theorem 3.20, it follows from the above that every modality is equivalent in K5 to a boolean combination of , ∇ 1 , . . . , ∇ 16 . But there are no more than 2 2 17 distinct combinations of this kind.
On the logic B
We shall prove two facts. On the one hand, Theorem 3.22 states that the sequence n collapses over B according to the external approach. On the other hand, Theorem 3.25 shows that B is "rich enough" from the viewpoint of the same approach.
Theorem 3.22
The logic B is iterative: B( n ) = B, for any n 2.
Proof. (⊇) The rules of B become admissible in B after the n -translation. Here we show schematically that the axioms of B become derivable in B after the ntranslation.
Then by the completeness of B, there exists a reflexive symmetric model (W, ⇑, |=) such that w |= A for some w ∈ W . Recall that a ⇑-chain of length k is a sequence of the form x 0 ⇑ . . . ⇑x k .
We endow W with a metric induced by ⇑ by putting (x, y) = min{r 0 | x⇑ r y}.
Metric axioms are easily verified. Recall that a ⇑-ball of radius r and center x ∈ W is the set x⇑ r = {y ∈ W | (x, y) r}. Denote F n := tr n (F ), for any F ∈ Fm. Now, to prove that B ¬A n we construct a model (W , ↑, |= ) such that A n is true at some world of W . The idea is to "disperse" each x ∈ W to a ↑-ball of radius m := n − 1. Formally, we put
Clearly, W ⊆ W . Let ↑ be the least reflexive symmetric relation on W satisfying the following conditions (see Figure 3 ):
• for all distinct x, y ∈ W there is a chain x↑x By induction on F . The atomic and boolean cases are trivial. Now it is convenient to consider the case F = ♦G; moreover, due to the symmetry of the claim, it suffices to prove only the '⇒' implication. a |= F n , i.e., a |= ♦ n G n iff ∃a ↓ n a a |= G n . Take y ∈ W such that a ∈ (y). Since  (a, a ) n, by (3) we have (x, y) 1, i. e., x⇑y. By (2), for our b ∈ (x) there exists b ∈ (y) such that b↑ n b . As a and b are in the same ball (y), by I.
By induction on F . Let F = G. We use the following obvious equality: Proof. Consider modalities ∇ n = n+1 ♦ n and formulas A m = (p → m p). To prove the theorem we show that for all n 1 and m 0,
(⇐) Assume that m n. We need B(∇ n ) A m , i.e.,
As B has the rule (Nec), we put away the prefix
, where the steps labelled by (ref) and (sym) use (zero or more times) the reflexivity and symmetry axioms, respectively.
(⇒) Assume that m > n. Since the rule (Nec) is reversible in B (due to the reflexivity axiom), we consider again the formula ( ). To prove that B ( ), we show that the reflexive symmetric chain shown in Figure 4 falsifies ( ) at the point x 0 (in the Figure 4 the valuation of p is also shown).
x n y 1 y 2 y m Figure 4 : x 0 |= ( ).
. . , y m−n } and m − n 1.
Expressibility of provability logics
All definitions and facts concerning provability logics can be found in [2] or in the survey paper [7] . We recall some of them briefly. Let T and U be two arithmetical theories, T recursively enumerable. Intuitively, the provability logic of T relative to U expresses those principles of provability in T that can be verified by means of U. More precisely, consider an arithmetical interpretation of modal formulas which assign to each propositional variable an arithmetical sentence, respects boolean connectives, and translates into a formula of provability in T. Then the provability logic of T relative to U is the set of all modal formulas whose all interpretations of this kind are provable in U. Every provability logic contains GL and is closed under (MP) and (Sub), but not necessarily under (RE) (hence not all of them are normal).
The basic provability logics are GL and the following two:
Denote by F n the formula n+1 ⊥ → n ⊥, for n ∈ ω = {0, 1, . . .}. The Classification Theorem proved by L. D. Beklemishev (cf. [2] ) states that the provability logics are exhausted by the following four families (here α, β ⊆ ω, β cofinite):
The inclusion of logics within each family reflects the inclusion of their indices (i.e., α and β), whereas for any cofinite β ⊆ ω the following additional strict inclusions hold:
The only provability logics closed under (RE) (and hence normal) are GL and GL
From the results stated in [1] it follows that only the following provability logics are iterative:
If all formulas of a modal logic L are true under all arithmetical interpretations in the standard model of arithmetic then L is called regular, otherwise singular. Logics GL α , D β , and S β are regular and S is the greatest of them, whereas GL − β are singular. As we shall see, values of ε(L) and α(L) are infinite for any regular provability logic and finite for any singular one.
Proof. We use the following completeness theorem for S proved by A. Visser (cf. [2, 7] ): S A iff A is true in all tail-models. We shall not bore the reader by giving the definition of a tail-model; for our purposes it will be enough to know that any irreflexive (ω + 1)
* -type linearly ordered Kripke model (W, ≺, |=) such that, for some r ∈ W , a valuation of any variable is the same at all points of {x | x ≺ r} is a tailmodel, and that a formula is said to be true in a tail-model if it is true at its least point.
Take X to be the set of odd natural numbers and n k := 2k. First we prove that modalities ∇ k := ∇ X n k , k 1, are non-equivalent in S (this will imply ε(S) = ∞ and hence ε(L) = ∞). Consider a tail-model (W, <, |=), where W = {b} ∪ V , V = {i ∈ Z | i 2k}, the restriction of < to V is the ordinary 'less-than' relation, b < i whenever i ∈ V , and for all x ∈ W , x |= p iff x 0 or x is odd. Then b |= ∇ k p → ∇ k+1 p.
Now we prove an analog of Lemma 3.15. Put n := |X ∩ (0, n k ]| = k. Take a frame (W, <) as above and the following valuation |= of p 1 , . . . , p N : for all x ∈ W , if x 0 then x |= p 1 else x |= p j iff x = 2j − 1, for all j, 1 j n. It is not hard to see that b |= tr ∇ k (A m N ). The theorem follows from Lemmas 3.14 and 3.27. Proof. First we consider the logics GL − n , n 0. Since they are closed under (RE), it suffices to show that ε(GL − n ) < ∞. A subformula F of a formula A is said to be on the depth n if it is in the scope of exactly n s. Let A (n) be the result of substituting of ⊥ for all subformulas of A that are on the depth n. If a modality ∇ is induced by a formula ϕ then denote by ∇ (n) a modality induced by ϕ (n) . The notion of degree of a formula is defined as usual; the degree of a modality is the degree of the corresponding formula.
We claim that GL
, for all A ∈ Fm; this follows from
which is easily proved by induction on n. Hence every modality ∇ is equivalent in GL − n to a modality ∇ (n) of degree non-larger than n. But (even in K) there exists only a finite number of non-equivalent modalities of bounded degree. Thus ε(GL 
Embeddings of logics
In this section we are mainly focused on obtaining results stating that some particular logics are not embeddable into some others. These results are of two sorts. The first ones are based on the simple observation that if a logic L is richer, in a sense, than a logic M then L is not embeddable into M . The second ones involve an unexpected fact that the presence of the symmetry axiom, i.e. the formula p → ♦p, in a logic prevents this logic from being embeddable into some strong logics, namely, into modalised logics (see Definition 4.4 below). A surprising corollary is, for example, that the "quite simple" logic S5 having ε(S5) = α(S5) = 16 is not embeddable into "rich enough" logics such as K.
In the sequel, L and M range over logics and Υ = {⊥, , ¬, }.
if L has a proper constant then so does M ; (4) the number of non-equivalent constants in L is no more than in M ;
Before giving a corollary, we recall the notion of the trace of a logic (cf. [2] ). It is worth noting that t(GL α ) = α and t(D β ) = t(S β ) = t(GL
Corollary 4.3 L → M in any of the following cases:
) L is a provability logic other than GL or GL − n and M is normal; (4) L is a regular provability logic and M is a singular one; (5) L ⊆ GL and M ⊇ GL α for some cofinite α ⊆ ω; (6) L, M ⊇ GL and 0 ∈ t(L) \ t(M ); (7) GL ⊆ L ⊆ Λ and M is normal. 
As in (6), L ⊆ Λ ∇ , for any ∇ ∈ Υ. But in [10] it was shown that, for any Proof. Consider GL first. Take the decomposition ( ) of a formula A and assume that GL B σ for some σ ∈ 2 n . Then there exists a f.i.t. tree with a root r such that r |= B σ . Since r is inaccessible from any point of the tree, the condition r |= B σ is independent of a valuation of variables at r, so we change |= by putting r |= p i iff σ i = . Then r |= A and so GL A.
To apply the same argument to L ∈ {K, K4, K5, K45}, we only need to prove the following: If L A then there exists an L-frame (W, ↑), a valuation |=, and an element r ∈ W such that r |= A and ∀x ∈ W ¬(x↑r).
But this is simple: By completeness of L, if L B then there is an L-frame (W, ↑), a valuation |= and an element r ∈ W such that r |= B. Now add to W a new element r, thus obtaining W := W ∪ {r}, put ⇑ := ↑ ∪ { r, x | r↑x}, and extend |= to r by putting r |= p iff r |= p, for all p ∈ Var. In each of our four cases, (W , ⇑) is an L-frame, ∀x ∈ W ¬(x⇑r), and r |= F iff r |= F , for all F ∈ Fm. Thus, r |= A. Lemma 4.6 If L is a modalised logic and X is a set of modalised formulas then LX is a modalised logic. Further, the decomposition ( ) applied to the ∇-translation of the symmetry axiom (AB) yields the only one condition (since the other one is a tautology):
(¬∆ ¬p ∧ ∆¬∇¬p) ∨ (∆ ¬p ∧ ∆ ¬∇¬p), which is truth-functionally equivalent to a conjunction of the following two conditions (we replaced ¬p by p; this is correct, for we could first substitute ¬p for p and then, equivalently even in E, replace ¬¬p by p):
Finally, L is closed under (Nec), hence the set of ∇-translations of theorems of L is closed in M under the rule (g) A ∆A. Now, since M ∆(p → p), substituting p for q in (b) yields (h) ∆ p → ∆p. By (e), from (f) it follows that (i) ∆ ¬∇p ∨ ∆¬∇p, whence by the scheme (h), we have (j) ∆¬∇p; by the decomposition ( ) of ∇p, it is equivalent (even in E) to (k) ∆[(∆p → ¬p) ∧ (∆ p → p)]. Now (d) and (g) imply that L(∆) is a normal logic, hence we have a principle of monotonicity:
GL α ⊆ Λ , so tr (A) is a tautology and is true in any tree, hence so is A n . Thus GL A n and A ∈ GL( n ). Case 0 ∈ α. We argue that GL α ( n+1 ) = GL( n+1 ). Again, '⊇' is obvious. Put m := n + 1 and F α := n∈α F n . Clearly, GL α A iff GL F α → A. Assume that A / ∈ GL( m ), then there exists a f.i.t. tree (W, ↑, |=) with the root r such that r |= A m . If d(r) < n then we add to this tree a chain x n ↑x n−1 ↑. . .↑x d(r) := r (so that d(x n ) = n) and extend |= so that x n and r validate the same variables. Then it is readily seen that x n and r validate the same formulas of the form F ∈ GL α ( m ).
